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Abstract. Lightweight cryptography has been one of the “hot topics” in symmetric
cryptography in the recent years. A huge number of lightweight algorithms have been
published, standardized and/or used in commercial products.
In this paper, we discuss the different implementation constraints that a “lightweight”
algorithm is usually designed to satisfy. We also present an extensive survey of
all lightweight symmetric primitives we are aware of. It covers designs from the
academic community, from government agencies and proprietary algorithms which
were reverse-engineered or leaked. Relevant national (nist...) and international
(iso/iec...) standards are listed. We then discuss some trends we identified in the
design of lightweight algorithms, namely the designers’ preference for arx-based and
bitsliced-S-Box-based designs and simple key schedules.
Finally, we argue that lightweight cryptography is too large a field and that it should
be split into two related but distinct areas: ultra-lightweight and IoT cryptography.
The former deals only with the smallest of devices for which a lower security level may
be justified by the very harsh design constraints. The latter corresponds to low-power
embedded processors for which the Aes and modern hash function are costly but
which have to provide a high level security due to their greater connectivity.
Keywords: Lightweight cryptography · Ultra-Lightweight · IoT · Internet of Things ·
SoK · Survey · Standards · Industry
1 Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) is one of the foremost buzzwords in computer science and
information technology at the time of writing. It is a very broad term describing the fact
that, in the near future, the Internet will be used more and more to connect devices to
one another other rather than to connect people together.
Some of these devices use powerful processors and can be expected to use the same
cryptographic algorithms as standard desktop PCs. However, many of them use extremely
low power micro-controllers which can only afford to devote a small fraction of their
computing power to security. Similarly, regular algorithms may incur too high a latency
or too high a power consumption for such platforms.
A common example of such use is that of sensor networks. Such networks are intended
to connect vast amounts of very simple sensors to a central hub. These sensors would run on
batteries and/or generate their own energy using for example solar panels. Cryptographic
algorithms must be used in the communication channels between the sensors and their hub
in order to provide security, authenticity and integrity of the messages. However, because
of the very low energy available, and because security is an overhead on top of the actual
functionality of the device, the cryptographic algorithms have to be as “small” as possible.
Similar reasoning goes for the size of ROM and RAM consumption of the cryptographic
algorithm.
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Similarly, rfid (Radio-Frequency IDentification) chips are used to identify devices,
animals — and even people. In order to prevent an eavesdropper from learning the
identification associated to a chip, this information has to be encrypted. Moreover, such
rfid tags can be used in challenge response protocols. Because of the very small number
of logical gates that can be used in such devices and because of the very little energy
available, specially designed algorithms are necessary.
A vast number of symmetric cryptographic algorithms have been proposed to fill these
use cases (see Table 1). They are usually referred to as “lightweight”. Their designs vary
greatly, the only unifying thread between them is the low computing power of the devices
intended to run them.
Still, we call “lightweight” a wide range of algorithms with different properties and
corresponding to very different use cases. As a consequence, it is difficult to give a clear
definition of what this term entails. For example, does it make sense for a “lightweight”
algorithm to be secure against attacks requiring a large amount of data? If the device
using it is a simple rfid tag, probably not. Conversely, if it is an internet-enabled device
downloading e.g. software updates at regular intervals, then such protection would be
desirable.
Our Contributions. In this paper, we systematize the knowledge in the area of lightweight
cryptography with the aim of better understanding what “lightweightness” is. Our work
is based on an extensive literature survey of more than 100 algorithms; the number of
algorithms considered is summarized in Table 1. Beyond merely listing these algorithms,
we identify the main trends in their design and discuss their standardization. Finally, we
argue that the design requirements corresponding to “lightweight cryptography” are too
broad. As a consequence, we suggest splitting this area into two sub-fields and provide a
general scope statement for algorithms fitting in each category.
Table 1: The number of lightweight symmetric algorithms surveyed in this paper.
Stream Block Hash Auth. Total
Academia 13 49 9 11 82
Proprietary 17 5 0 1 23
Government 1 5 0 0 6
Total 31 59 9 12 111
Outline. Section 2 lists the design constraints that make an algorithm lightweight. Both
the hardware and software cases are described. Then, we list all symmetric cryptographic
lightweight algorithms we are aware of in Section 3. We consider algorithms published at
cryptography/security conferences as well as those designed by government agencies, those
specified in standards and those designed by the industry which were reverse-engineered
from actual products. In particular, the following tables list lightweight algorithms along
with a reference for their specification and some of their properties such as key and block
sizes:
∙ Table 4 lists ciphers from the industry. None of them provides more than 64 bits of
security either by design (short key), because of weaknesses in their design, or both;
∙ algorithms published at cryptography/security conferences or submitted to cryptog-
raphy competitions are listed in Table 5 (block ciphers), Table 6 (hash functions),
Table 7 (stream ciphers), and Table 8 (authenticated ciphers); and
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∙ Table 9 lists public ciphers designed by government agencies.
We also survey the standardization of lightweight crypto by both national and international
bodies in Section 4. We also consider the primitives used by some software libraries
intended for embedded devices.
In Section 5, we investigate some trends in the field of lightweight cryptography such
as the increasing popularity of lighter key schedules. Finally, we argue in Section 6 for
a division in the field of lightweight cryptography between ultra-lightweight and IoT
crypto targeting respectively the most constrained devices (e.g rfid tags) and networked
embedded devices.
2 Design Constraints
The metrics usually optimised are the memory consumption, the implementation size and
the speed or throughput of the primitive. However, the specifics of the comparison depend
on whether hardware or software implementations are considered.
2.1 Hardware Case
If the primitive is implemented in hardware, the memory consumption and the implemen-
tation size are lumped together into its gate area which is measured in Gate Equivalents
(GE). It quantifies how physically large a circuit implementing the primitive is. The
throughput is measured in bytes per second and corresponds to the amount of plaintext
processed per time unit.
The exact measures depend on the exact type of circuit considered, e.g. the frequency
at which it is clocked or the area of each gate. Furthermore, the tools used to simulate
those circuits do not give the same results and are usually both proprietary and expensive.
Therefore, a fair comparison of the different algorithms proposed regarding their hardware
implementation is very difficult. In fact, when comparing their new algorithm with existing
ones, designers are usually forced to design their own implementations of preexisting ones
too.
Memory is usually the most expensive part of the implementation of a lightweight
primitive. In most cases, implementations work by storing the full internal state and key
state and then perform one round in 𝑐 clock cycle, e.g. one round per clock cycle.1 As a
consequence, it is preferable to operate on small blocks using a small key.
However, some space can be saved by hard-coding or “burning” the keys into the device.
That is, instead of using read/write memory to store the key, use read-only structures. In
order for this method to be viable, the key schedule must build the round keys using only
simple operations taking as input the bits of the master key. In particular, no key state
can be operated upon. This strategy has been used by several algorithms, both block and
stream ciphers, as shown in Section 5.2.2.
More recently, other criteria have emerged for the design of lightweight algorithms.
For example, energy and power efficiency of a hardware implementation are at the core
of the design of the Midori block cipher published about a year ago [BBI+15]. Another
criteria is latency, that is, the time taken to perform a given operation. There are contexts
in which the low-latency is crucial, for example for memory encryption. This particular
requirement demands specific design choices as illustrated by the lightweight block ciphers
Prince [BCG+12] followed by Mantis [BJK+16] and Qarma [Ava17].
1It is a bit more complicated in the case of a serial implementation. They only update a small part of
the state at each round — typically the size of an S-Box — but, due to the simplicity of the logic involved,
they allow a far higher clock frequency.
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2.2 Software Case
Primitives can be also implemented in software, typically for use on micro-controllers. In
this case, the relevant metrics are the ram consumption, the code size and the throughput
of the primitive measured in bytes per cpu cycle. The Felics framework allows a relevant
comparison of these quantities across algorithms and across different implementations of a
given algorithm. This framework was presented in [DBG+15]. The name Felics stands
for “Fair Evaluation of LIghtweight Cryptographic Systems”.
Felics takes as input the implementation of a block or stream cipher and outputs
the corresponding code size, ram consumption and time taken to perform a given task.
These quantities are obtained for three different micro-controllers: an 8-bit avr, a 16-bit
msp and a 32-bit arm. The tasks investigated correspond to different scenarios such as
the encryption of a 128-bit block in counter-mode. The information extracted is then
summarized into a single quantity called Figure of Merit (FoM), the lower the better. It
can be used to rank block ciphers, as shown in Table 2 where the block and key sizes are in
bits, the code size and maximum ram consumption are in bytes and the time is in number
of cpu cycles.
Table 2: The current best Felics results for scenario 2: counter mode encryption of 128
bits.
General info avr (8-bit) msp (16-bit) arm (32-bit) FoM
Name block key Code ram Time Code ram Time Code ram Time
Chaskey 128 128 770 84 1597 490 86 1351 178 80 614 4.7
Speck 64 96 448 53 2829 328 48 1959 256 56 1003 4.8
Speck 64 128 452 53 2917 332 48 2013 276 60 972 4.9
Chaskey-LTS 128 128 770 84 2413 492 86 2064 178 80 790 5.4
Simon 64 96 600 57 4269 460 56 2905 416 64 1335 6.6
Simon 64 128 608 57 4445 468 56 3015 388 64 1453 6.8
Lea 128 128 906 80 4023 722 78 2814 520 112 1171 7.6
Rectangle 64 128 602 56 4381 480 54 2651 452 76 2432 8.1
Rectangle 64 80 606 56 4433 480 54 2651 452 76 2432 8.1
Sparx 64 128 662 51 4397 580 52 2261 654 72 2338 8.3
Sparx 128 128 1184 74 5478 1036 72 3057 1468 104 2935 12.4
RC5-20 64 128 1068 63 8812 532 60 15925 372 64 1919 13.5
Aes 128 128 1246 81 3408 1170 80 4497 1348 124 4044 14.1
Hight 64 128 636 56 6231 636 52 7117 670 100 5532 14.8
Fantomas 128 128 1712 76 9689 1920 78 3602 2184 184 4550 18.8
Robin 128 128 2530 108 7813 1942 80 4913 2188 184 6250 22.0
The three quantities measured are not independent. For example, loading information
from the ram into cpu registers is a costly operation and so is its inverse. Therefore,
limiting the number of such operations leads to a decrease in both ram consumption and
time complexity.
2.3 Side-Channel Attack Resilience
Side-channel attacks (scas) use some special knowledge about the implementation of
a cipher to break its security. For example, observing the power consumption of an
encryption can leak information about the Hamming weight of the output of an S-Box.
Such attacks demand that the cryptanalyst has physical access to the device attacked.
However, this requirement is particularly easy to fulfill in the context of the IoT: a desktop
computer can be expected to be reasonably hard to physically interact with because it
is in a locked room but a sensor measuring traffic in an open street may not enjoy such
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protection.
As a consequence, lightweight algorithms are often built in such a way as to decrease
the vulnerability of their implementation to such attacks. This can be done through the use
of inherently less leaky operations or by simplifying the use of a masked implementation.
These topics are further discussed in Section 5.1.
2.4 Common Trade-Offs
To accommodate these constraints, most lightweight algorithms are designed to use smaller
internal states and smaller key sizes. Indeed, while a 128-bit block and at least 128-bit
key was demanded from the Aes candidates, most lightweight block ciphers use only
64-bit blocks. This smaller size leads to a smaller memory footprint in both software
and hardware. It also means that the algorithm is better suited for processing smaller
messages.
Nevertheless, the small block size can be a problem as the security of some modes of
operation such as cbc erodes very quickly when the number of 𝑛-bit blocks encrypted
approaches 2𝑛/2, as exploited for example in [BL16]. As a consequence, dedicated modes
of operation such as [LPTY16] have been proposed to mitigate these issues. Furthermore,
key sizes are often as small as 80 bits which offers little security margin against brute-force
search. Such an attack is likely to be infeasible nowadays for all but the most powerful
state sponsored adversaries, but how long will this last? As pointed out in [BMS06],
time-memory-data tradeoff can become an issue if the key size is too small, especially in
the multi-key setting.
In the case of lightweight block ciphers, it is also common for the components used to
be involutions so as to decrease the cost of the implementation of decryption. This can
be done by using non-linear involutions as S-Boxes or by using a Feistel structure. On
the other hand, this issue can be mitigated through the use of modes of operations that
do not require block cipher decryption. For example, if a block cipher is used in counter
mode, the area/rom which would be needed to store the description of the inverse block
cipher can be saved.
Finally, due to the importance of their performance, lightweight algorithms often have
thinner security margins. For example, Ketje [BDP+16] is a sponge-based authenticated
cipher where the sponge transformation uses only one round. That is, it does not even
provide full diffusion. This obvious issue is offset by the use of a non-repeating nonce.
2.5 Are Dedicated Algorithms Needed?
As lightweightness is mostly a property of the implementation of an algorithm, we can
wonder if dedicated algorithms are actually needed. Would it not be sufficient to use
lightweight implementations of regular algorithms?
It is often possible. For example, many implementers have worked on optimising
the implementation of the Aes with some success in both hardware [BJM+14, BBR16,
UMHA16] and software [SS16]. Even if an efficient implementation of the Aes is impossible
using the instructions available on a micro-controller, those devices are sometimes shipped
with a hardware acceleration module for this task, effectively adding a new set of instructions
dedicated entirely to a quick evaluation of this block cipher.
In this context, lightweight symmetric algorithms may seem unnecessary. However,
block cipher hardware acceleration has its limitations. As summarized for example in
Table 1 of [OC16] (which is reproduced in Table 3), the hardware-accelerated encryptions
used by many devices are vulnerable to various forms of side-channel attacks. These attacks
do not only target these devices “in a vacuum”. For example, Philips light bulbs using
the Zigbee protocol to communicate have been recently shown to be insecure [ROSW16].
One of the key components of this attack is a subversion of the update mechanism of the
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light bulb. Updates are normally authenticated with an Aes-based mac using a secret key
which is constant across all devices. Ronen et al. recovered this key via an sca and were
therefore able to push malicious updates to these devices.
Table 3: Several micro-processors whose hardware accelerated cryptography is vulnerable
to sca (reproduced from [OC16]).
Product Cipher
DESFire, MF3ICD40 3-Des
DS2432, DS28E01 Sha-1
Microchip HCSXXX Keeloq
ProASIC3 Aes
Spartan-6 Aes
Stratix II Aes
Stratix III Aes
Virtex-II 3-Des
Virtext-4, Virtex-5 Aes
XMEGA Aes
Yubikey Aes
Still, there are cases where side-channel attacks are not really relevant. For example,
a yubikey2 is supposed to be always carried by its owner, so that studying its power
consumption is not practical for the adversary. However, if attackers can easily access
devices with the secret key they are after, e.g. in the case of a wireless sensor network,
such a weakness is not acceptable. This problem could be mitigated by using protected
implementations such as masked ones.
On micro-controllers without hardware support for cryptographic functions, their
assembly implementation must be as small and as fast as possible. In these cases, the
Aes is decently fast, especially on 8-bit micro-controllers where it is in fact one of the
fastest. However, its implementation requires storing at least the full look-up-table of its
8-bit S-Box, meaning that its code size cannot be as small as that of dedicated algorithms.
All in all, while the Aes is a reasonably lightweight block cipher, its large S-Box, large
block size and inherent vulnerability to sca caused by its look-up-based S-Box make it a
suboptimal choice in many cases.
Another case where dedicated lightweight algorithms are needed is for hashing. Indeed,
standard hash functions need large amounts of memory to store both their internal states
— 1600 bits in the case of Sha-3 — and the block they are operating on — 512 bits in the
case of the Sha-2 family. These memory requirements significantly hinder performance on
lightweight platforms and justify the need for dedicated lightweight hash functions.
3 A Survey of Symmetric Lightweight Algorithms
Several very distinct actors are involved in the field of lightweight cryptography. In fact,
they are the same that discuss “regular” cryptography: academia, industry, standardizing
bodies and government agencies — including spying agencies.
The industry is supposed to be the implementer of those algorithms, designing or
choosing the best one for their purpose. Unfortunately, until the 2000’s and the spread of
the Aes, many of the algorithms had been designed in-house with little regard to what is
considered best practice. The corresponding algorithms are described in Section 3.1.
2A yubikey is a commercial usb drive designed to store cryptographic keys securely and use them in
authentication protocols.
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Academics have published dozens of symmetric cryptographic algorithms claiming to be
lightweight. Those are listed in Section 3.2. Said publications always contain a description
of the cryptanalysis attempts by the authors of the algorithm.
This creates a significant contrast with the algorithms proposed by government agencies:
even their public algorithms have been designed in a secret way. Furthermore, these agencies
are more often than not also in charge of spying, (see the American nsa and the Russian
fsb), meaning that they have contradictory incentives. On the one hand, it is their task
to ensure the security of their own citizens which may imply designing strong encryption.
On the other hand, as evidenced by the first crypto wars and the current ongoing debate
surrounding the alleged fear of some law enforcement agencies of “going dark”, they may
also seek to purposefully weaken these standards. What might have been discounted
as mere conspiracy theory a few years ago is now an established fact: the Snowden
documents show that the nsa has a budget dedicated to the subversion of cryptographic
standards and has pushed for the standardization by NIST of the easily trapdoored Dual
EC pseudo-random number generator [BLN15]. In a similar vein, as shown in [BPU16]
the latest Russian standards designed by fsb share an S-Box with a hidden structure,
which still leaves cryptographers puzzled over its purpose. This situation also resembles
controversy over S-boxes of Des, whose design criteria were not published at the time of
standardization of Des. For any user familiar with the trapdoored horse story [HomBC],
such developments are highly unsettling. We list lightweight algorithms designed by
government agencies in Section 3.3.
3.1 Algorithms from the Industry
Many lightweight algorithms used by industrial products are surprisingly weak. Many of
those algorithms were designed in the 80’s or early 90’s, a time during which cipher design
had to accommodate for the stringent American export laws which forbid selling devices
with strong cryptography. Still, like modern lightweight algorithms, those were intended
to run on devices with little computing power devoted to encryption.
They were also intended to be kept secret, their secrecy hopefully enhancing their
security. However, They were eventually released through leaks or reverse-engineering.3
In a clear vindication of Kerchkoffs’ law [Ker83], they were broken as soon as they were
made public. Attacks with a time complexity under 240 evaluations of the primitive exist
for all of these algorithms except for Csa ciphers. Many of them are the target of even
more powerful cryptanalyses.
These primitives are described in Appendix A and listed in Table 4. Block ciphers
are marked with “†”, macs with “‡” and unmarked primitives are stream ciphers. The
internal state (IS), key and initialization vector (IV) sizes are expressed in bits. For block
ciphers, the internal state size corresponds to the block size. The time complexity of the
best attack targeting the full round primitive is given in the column “Att. time”.
3.2 A Semi-Exhaustive List of Public Algorithms
Throughout the last 25 years and especially since 2011, a lot of algorihtms intended
to be lightweight have been published in cryptography- and security-related conference
proceedings and journals. Those are listed in this section.
The algorithms in these lists have either been advertised as lightweight in their speci-
fication, have a very small implementation or have been standardized as such. Figure 1
provides an overview of all lightweight symmetric algorithms published by academics,
sorted by publication date and by type.
3Except for E0 and for PC-1.
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Table 4: A summary of all lightweight primitives from the industry we are aware of.
Name Things Reference Key IS IV Att. time
A5/1
Cell phones
[And94] 64 64 22 224
A5/2 [BBK08] 64 81 22 216
Cmea † [WSK97] 64 16–48 – 232
Oryx [WSD+99] 96 96 – 216
A5-GMR-1 Satellite phones [DHW
+12] 64 82 19 238.1
A5-GMR-2 [DHW+12] 64 68 22 228
Dsc Cordless phones [LST+09] 64 80 35 234
SecureMem. Atmel chips [GvRVWS10] 64 109 128 2
29.8
CryptoMem. 64 117 128 250
Hitag2 [VGB12] 48 48 64 235
Megamos Car key/ [VGE13] 96 57 56 248
Keeloq † immobilizer [BSK96] 64 32 – 244.5
Dst40 † [BGS+05] 40 40 – 240
iClass Smart cards [GdKGV14] 64 40 – 2
40
Crypto-1 [NESP08] 48 48 96 232
Css DVD players [BD04] 40 42 – 2
40
Cryptomeria † [BKLM09] 56 64 – 248
Csa-BC † Digital televisions [WW05] 64 64 – 2
64
Csa-SC 64 103 64 245.7
PC-1 Amazon Kindle [BLR13] 128 152 – 231
SecurID ‡ Secure token [BLP04] 64 64 – 244
E0 Anything [FL01] 128 128 – 2
38
RC4 [Nob94] 128 2064 – 232
Figure 1: Lightweight algorithms published by academics. Block cipher-based authenti-
cated ciphers are listed as “BC-based AE”; sponge-based algorithms are shown as such.
3.2.1 Block ciphers
Block ciphers are the most common choice for academic designers trying to build a
lightweight symmetric algorithm. All those designed and published by academics we are
aware of are listed in Table 5 where they are sorted by date of publication. We use “†” to
mark block ciphers published as part of a higher level construction, e.g. an authenticated
cipher submitted to Caesar4 or a mac; and “‡” to indicate tweakable block ciphers.
4The project Caesar (Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability, and Ro-
bustness) aims at identifying the best authenticated ciphers. All submissions are listed on the following
webpage: http://competitions.cr.yp.to/caesar-submissions.html.
Alex Biryukov and Léo Perrin 9
Table 5: A summary of all lightweight block ciphers published at cryptography and
security conference we are aware of, sorted by publication date.
Description Parameters
Name Ref. Key Block Rounds
3-Way [DGV94] 96 96 11
RC5 [Riv95] 0–2040 32/64/128 12
Misty1 [Mat97] 128 64 8
Xtea [NW97] 128 64 64
Aes [DR98] 128/192/256 128 10/12/14
Bksq [DR00] 96 96/144/192 10/14/18
Khazad [BR00] 128 64 8
Noekeon [DPVAR00] 128 128 16
Iceberg [SPR+04] 128 64 16
mCrypton [LK06] 64/96/128 64 12
Hight [HSH+06] 128 64 32
Sea [SPGQ06] 96 96 93
Clefia [SSA+07] 128/192/256 128 18/22/26
Deslx [LPPS07] 184 64 16
Present [BKL+07] 80/128 64 31
Mibs [ISSK09] 64/80 64 32
Katan/Ktantan [CDK09] 80 32/48/64 254
Gost revisited [PLW10] 256 64 32
PrintCipher [KLPR10] 48/96 80/160 48/96
Epcbc [YKPH11] 96 48/96 32
Klein [GNL11] 64/80/96 64 12/16/20
LBlock [WZ11] 80 64 32
Led [GPPR11] 64/128 64 32/48
Piccolo [SIH+11] 80/128 64 25/31
Picaro [PRC12] 128 128 12
Prince [BCG+12] 128 64 12
ITUbee [KDH13] 80 80 20
Twine [SMMK13] 80/128 64 36
Zorro [GGNS13] 128 128 24
Chaskey † [MMH+14] 128 128 8/12/16
Pride [ADK+14] 128 64 20
Joltik † ‡ [JNP14] 64/80/96/128 64 24/32
Lea [HLK+14] 128/192/256 128 24/28/32
iScream † ‡ [GLS+14] 128 128 12/14
LBlock-s † [ZWW+14] 80 64 32
Scream † ‡ [GLS+14] 128 128 10/12
Lilliput [BFMT15] 80 64 30
Rectangle [ZBL+15] 80/128 64 25
Fantomas [GLSV15] 128 128 12
Robin [GLSV15] 128 128 16
Midori [BBI+15] 128 64/128 16/20
Simeck [YZS+15] 64/96/128 32/48/64 32/36/44
RoadRunneR [BŞ16] 80/128 64 10/12
Fly [KG16] 128 64 20
Mantis ‡ [BJK+16] 128 64 14
Skinny ‡ [BJK+16] 64–384 64/128 32–56
Sparx [DPU+16] 128/256 64/128 24–40
Mysterion [JSV17] 128/256 128/256 12
Qarma ‡ [Ava17] 128/256 64/128 16/24
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3.2.2 Hash functions
It is more difficult to implement a lightweight hash function than a lightweight block
cipher. Indeed, they usually require a much larger internal state which is reasonable on a
desktop computer but would have a prohibitive cost on a lightweight device. For example,
Sha-3 uses a 1600-bit internal state which dwarfs the 64-bit block of most lightweight
block ciphers.
And yet, since a collision in the internal state leads to a collision in the final digest, it
has to have at least a size corresponding to the desired security level.
As an answer to this problem, several designers chose the use of a sponge construction
with a very small rate. Indeed, the internal state of a sponge is divided into two distinct
parts:
∙ the 𝑟-bit rate decides how fast the plaintext is processed and how fast the final digest
is produced, and
∙ the 𝑐-bit capacity determines the security level as for example a birthday collision
search succeeds with a time complexity of roughly 2𝑐/2 independently of the digest
size.
For example, using a capacity of 128 bits along with a rate of 8 bits, as done in some
versions of the hash functions listed below, minimizes the memory footprint at the cost of
a slower data processing.
All lightweight hash functions we are aware of are in Table 6. The internal state (IS)
size usually refers to the size of the chaining value. However, for example in Blake2, the
update function operates on the chaining value and on an IV of the same size, so that its
internal state is twice as big. Sponge-based hash functions are marked with a “‡” symbol.
Table 6: A summary of all lightweight hash functions from academia. The digest, internal
state (IS) and block sizes are expressed in bits.
Name Reference Digest Block IS
Armadillo [BDN+10] 80/128/160/256 48/64/80/128 256/384/576/768
Blake2s/b [ANWOW13] 8–256/8–512 512/1024 512/1024
Gluon ‡ [BDM+12] 128/160/224 8/16/32 136/176/256
Lesamnta-LW [HIK+11] 256 128 256
Photon ‡ [GPP11] 80/128/160/224/256 16/32/36 100/144/196/256/288
Quark ‡ [AHMN10] 136/176/256 8/16/32 136/176/256
SipHash ‡ [AB12] 64 64 256
Spn-Hash ‡ [CYK+12] 128/256 256/512 128/256
Spongent ‡ [BKL+11] 80/128/160/224/256 8/16 88/136/176/240/272
3.2.3 Stream ciphers
The estream competition was held in 2008 to choose two portfolios of stream ciphers. The
first type of algorithms fits the so-called software profile, meaning that they were aimed at
software efficiency. The second category was the hardware profile. Further, some of them
use an internal state so small that they can be considered to be lightweight stream ciphers.
However, lightweight stream ciphers were proposed outside the framework of this
competition. For example, Snow 3G corresponds to a simple modification of the academic-
designed Snow 2.0 tailored for specific industrial needs: it is used in the 3GPP com-
munication standard. All such lightweight stream ciphers we are aware of are listed in
Table 7.
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Table 7: A summary of all lightweight stream ciphers from academia we are aware of. The
key, internal state (IS) and initialization vector (IV) sizes are expressed in bits.
Name Reference Key IV IS
A2U2 [DRL11] 61 64 95
Chacha20 [Ber08a] 256 64 256
Enocoro-80 [WIK+08] 80 64 176
F-fcsr-H/16 [ABL+09] 80/128 80/128 160/256
Grain [HJM07] 80/128 64/96 160/256
Lizard [HKM17] 120 † 64 121
Mickey v2 [BD08] 80/128 0–80/0–128 200/320
Plantlet [MAM17] 80 90 110 ‡
Salsa20 [Ber08b] 256 64 256
Snow 2.0 [EJ03] 128/256 128 576
Snow 3G [ETS06] 128 128 576
Sprout [AM15] 80 70 89 ‡
Trivium [Can06] 80 80 288
†While Lizard uses a 120-bit key, its designers only claim 80-bit security.
‡The key is stored separately from the internal state in non-volatile memory.
3.2.4 Dedicated Authenticated Encryption Schemes
Following the call for submissions of the Caesar competition, several lightweight authen-
ticated encryption schemes were proposed. Some of them rely on dedicated block ciphers
used with specific modes, in which case their underlying block cipher is in Table 5. How-
ever, other algorithms based on sponge transformation or stream cipher-like construction
were also proposed. These are listed in Table 8. As with hash functions, sponge-based
algorithms are marked with the symbol “‡”.
Table 8: A summary of all lightweight authenticated ciphers from academia. The key,
initialization vector (IV) and internal state (IS) are expressed in bits.
Name Reference Key IV IS
Acorn [Wu16] 128 128 293
Ale [BMR+14] 128 128 128
Asc-1 [JK12] 256 56 384
Ascon ‡ [DEMS16] 96/128 96/128 320
Fides [BBK+13] 80/96 160/192 80/96
Hummingbird-2 [ESSS12] 128 64 128
Ketje ‡ [BDP+16] ≤ 182/382 182− 𝑘/382− 𝑘 200/400
Lac [ZWW+14] 80 64 144
Norx32 ‡ [AJN16] 128 128 512
Helix [FWS+03] 256 128 160
Sablier [ZSX+14] 80 80 208
3.3 Algorithms from Government Agencies
Governmental agencies have published their own lightweight ciphers. The publication is
often done via national standards. These ciphers are usually targeting local usage but, due
to the interconnection of the markets and the corresponding standardizing efforts, these
can end up being used outside of their expected zone of influence.
For example, Simon and Speck are two block ciphers designed by the American
National Security Agency (nsa) which were disclosed on eprint.iacr.org [BSS+13].
12 State of the Art in Lightweight Symmetric Cryptography
However, they might in the end be used outside of the usa as the nsa is lobbying iso/iec
to include them as part of the standard for “lightweight cryptography”, as mentioned in
Section 4.1. The designers of these algorithms were invited to present these algorithms to
the Design Automation Conference (dac) of 2015 but their paper [BTCS+15] provides
little insight into their process. In particular, it discloses no information regarding their
security analysis.
The Skipjack block cipher is in a similar position. The rationale behind its design
is not known. The only public information comes from the report written by external
cryptographers after two days spent at the nsa headquarters [BDK+93] and from several
attempts at reverse-engineering its structure [KRW99, KW01] and its S-Box [BP15].
While some of the design criteria used to build the S-Boxes of the Des [U.S99] have
eventually been published [Cop94], the exact generation process remains a mystery.
Finally, the same can be said of the Russian lightweight block cipher Magma. It
is specified as a part of the latest Russian standard for block ciphers, Gost R 34.12–
2015 [Fed15], which both describes this algorithm and the heavier Kuznyechik. Again,
the rationale behind these designs is not known. Their specification merely discloses the
algorithms, not their design process and especially not the best cryptanalysis of their
authors.
The stream cipher Zuc was designed by the Data Assurance and Communication
Security Research Center (DACAS) of the Chinese Academy of Science. It was published
directly as part of the 3GPP standard [ETS11]. This addition was caused by the demand
from the Chinese government to use Chinese algorithms when operating in China. Zuc
should in theory not be used while in other countries. Unlike in the cases of the Russian
and American algorithms, some information is provided regarding its design. In particular,
several modifications were made necessary by external cryptanalysis which are described
in [ETS11]. Nevertheless, the cryptanalysis (hopefully) performed by its original designers
is, to the best of our knowledge, still secret.
The public lightweight ciphers designed by government agencies are listed in Table 9.
The stream cipher is marked with the “†” symbol.
Table 9: A summary of all ciphers from government agencies. The key, initialization
vector (IV) and internal state (IS) are expressed in bits. For block ciphers, the internal
state corresponds to the block.
Name Reference Key IS Rounds IV
Des [U.S99] 56 64 16 –
Magma [Fed15] 256 64 32 –
Simon [BSS+13] 64–256 32–128 32–72 –
Skipjack [U.S98] 80 64 32 –
Speck [BSS+13] 64–256 32–128 22–34 –
Zuc † [ETS11] 128 560 – 128
4 Lightweight Cryptography in the Wild
Several standards and libraries are aimed at use cases overlapping with those of lightweight
cryptography. These are listed in this section and summarized in Table 10. Section 4.1
deals with iso/iec standards, Section 4.2 with regional cryptographic ones, Section 4.3
with general purpose communication protocols run by low power devices and, finally,
Section 4.4 describes several libraries specifically aimed at the IoT.
Alex Biryukov and Léo Perrin 13
Table 10: Standards and libraries involving lightweight algorithms.
Type Name Lightweight algorithms standardized
iso/iec
29167 Aes-128, Present-80, Grain-128A
29192-2 Present, Clefia
29192-3 Enocoro, Trivium
29192-5 Photon, Lesamnta-LW, Spongent
18033-3 Aes, Misty1, Hight
18033-4 Snow 2.0
Regional
FIPS 185 (usa) Skipjack (now deprecated [BR15])
FIPS 197 (usa) Aes
Nessie (EU) Aes, Misty1
estream portfolio (EU) Grain, Trivium, Salsa20, Mickey
gost R 34.12–2015 (Russia) Magma
Protocols
GSM A5/1, A5/2, A5/3 (Kasumi)
3G Snow 3G, Zuc, Aes, Kasumi
Bluetooth E0, Aes
Bluetooth smart Aes
WEP RC4
WPA RC4
WPA2 Aes
Lora Alliance Aes
IEEE 802.15.4 (Zigbee) Aes
Embedded Lib.
Tinysec Skipjack (CBC), (RC5)
Minisec Skipjack (OCB)
mbedTLS (ciphers) Aes, RC4, Xtea, Blowfish, 3-Des, Camellia
mbedTLS (hash functions) MD5, Sha-1, Sha-256, Sha-512
4.1 Iso/iec cryptographic standards.
The International Organization for Standards (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC) are tasked with issuing and maintaining standards regarding information
and communication technology.
Three of their standards are particularly relevant for lightweight cryptography. The
first is ISO/IEC 29167: Information technology – Automatic identification and data capture
techniques, in particular parts 10, 11 and 13. Those deal with the symmetric ciphers that
should be used for securing “air interface communications”, that is, rfid tags. These parts
describe respectively Aes-128, Present-80 and Grain-128A. Other parts deal with public
key cryptography.
Another set of relevant iso/iec standards are those with number 29192 which deal
specifically with “lightweight cryptography”. The following algorithms are part of this
series of standards: the block ciphers Present and Clefia, the stream ciphers Trivium
and Enocoro, and the hash functions Photon, Spongent and Lesamnta-LW. The criteria
for algorithms to be considered for inclusion in this standard are listed in the following
quote from Annex A of said standard.
a) The security of the cryptographic mechanism. 80-bit security is considered
to be the minimum security strength for lightweight cryptography. It is
however recommended that at least 112-bit security be applied for systems
that will require security for longer periods (refer to SD12 for security
strength references, as the period of protection provided is determined
by the security strength as well as the computing power of the adversary
who wishes to break the algorithm.).
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b) The hardware implementation properties (for hardware targeted mecha-
nisms). The chip area occupied by the cryptographic mechanism (reduced
compared to existing ISO standards) and the energy consumption. (clear
advantage over existing ISO standards, e.g. ISO/IEC 18033, ISO/IEC
9798, ISO/IEC 11770).
c) The software implementation properties (for software targeted mecha-
nisms). In particular, the code size and the required RAM size. (Less
resource requirements compared to existing standards on the same plat-
form are considered as potentially lightweight for software environments).
d) The nature of any licensing issues affecting the cryptographic mechanism.
e) The maturity of the cryptographic mechanism.
f) The generality of the lightweight properties claimed for the cryptographic
mechanism (i.e. the more independent the claimed lightweight property
is from implementation in a specific technology, the better, as it will be
useable by a wider audience).
At the time of writing, the block ciphers Simon and Speck designed by the nsa were
being considered for inclusion in this standard.
Finally, standard 18033 describes “Encryption algorithms”. Some of those can be
considered lightweight, such as the block ciphers Aes, Misty1 and Hight (in 18033-3)
and the stream cipher Snow 2.0 (in 18033-4).
4.2 Regional Cryptographic Standards
Several regional standards deal with cryptography in general and some of the algorithm
specified in them can be considered to be lightweight. In the usa, cryptographic standards
are handled by the National Institute for Standards and Technology (nist) which famously
standardized the Aes after an open competition. This institution is currently working to-
wards a standard for lightweight cryptography, as explained in a detailed report [MBTM16].
Their intention is to agree upon several profiles corresponding to different algorithms, use
cases and constraints. Then, possibly different algorithms will be standardized for use
in each of these profiles. The legacy cipher Skipjack was a nist standard but it is now
deprecated.
In Europe, the Nessie project selected several block ciphers including the Aes and
Misty1. Its failure to find good stream ciphers lead to the estream competition. At
its end, a portfolio of stream ciphers was published. It is divided into two profiles, one
software oriented and one hardware oriented. Several of those stream ciphers can be
considered to be lightweight: Trivium, Grain, Mickey and Salsa20.
Finally, the latest Russian standard for block ciphers contains the 64-bit block cipher
Magma.
4.3 Communication protocols
Several communication protocols specify a form of encryption which, given the nature of
the devices running them, have to be lightweight. For example, cell phones are not nearly
as powerful as computers, although Moore’s law and modern smartphones complicate this
picture.
The GSM and 3G networks deal with cell phone communication. They specify that
communications should be encrypted using A5/1, A5/2, A5/3 (Kasumi in counter mode),
Snow 3G, Zuc or Kasumi, the latter being a variant of Misty1.
Bluetooth connects devices over short distances. The original specification required
the stream cipher E0 but it was later replaced by the Aes. A more recent variant called
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“Bluetooth smart” aims at lower energy consumption. It also relies on the Aes for its
security.
Modern WiFi connections are secured using wpa or wpa2. The former uses RC4 while
the latter moved on to the Aes. The previous standard was wep, which used RC4, but
practical attacks exist against it.
Several protocols have recently been proposed to connect wireless IoT devices to one
another. The one put forward by the Lora Alliance uses the Aes. The same is true for
ieee 802.15.4, which is used e.g. in Zigbee.
4.4 IoT Oriented Libraries.
Let us look at two libraries intended for embedded devices. The first we consider is
tinysec5 which is used in the security-related stack of the TinyOS operating system. It
uses Skipjack in cbc mode, although RC5 was also considered and found to be quite
efficient [KSW04]. Its successor is minisec6 and it also uses Skipjack but in ocb mode.
The library mbedTLS which also targets embedded devices but is not tied to TinyOS offers
several algorithms, namely the ciphers Aes, RC4, Xtea, Blowfish, 3-Des and Camellia as
well as the hash functions MD5, Sha-1, Sha-256 and Sha-512.
5 Trends in Lightweight Design
Lightweightness can be seen as a set of specific design constraints. These are tackled
differently by different algorithms but some trends emerge when we look at the evolution
of lightweight block ciphers. These are particularly visible on two fronts: the choice of the
non-linear operations and the key schedule which are described respectively in Section 5.1
and in 5.2. In Section 5.3, the fact that fewer bad ciphers seem to be in use now than 15
years ago is discussed.
5.1 Non-Linear Operations
Non-linearity is a necessary property of any cryptographic primitive. It can be provided by
S-Boxes or through the use of non-linear arithmetic operations. S-Box-based algorithms can
further be divided into two categories. The first implements them using Look-Up Tables
(lut) and the second relies on bit-sliced implementations. As for arithmetic operations,
only modular additions are considered here, that is, primitives following the arx paradigm.
Although other operations are sometimes used, such as modular multiplication in the block
cipher Idea [LM91] and the PC1 stream cipher, these are extremely uncommon.
5.1.1 Lut-based
Lut-based algorithms use S-Boxes which are intended to be implemented using look-up
tables in software. Such functions are useful as they can offer (near) optimal cryptographic
properties using only one operation. However, their implementation requires storing all
possible outputs which, for an 8-bit S-Box such as the one used by the Aes, has a significant
cost. Furthermore, the table look-up is the operation leaking the most information, as
shown in [BDG16].
S-Boxes intended to be implemented using luts in software usually correspond to a
simple electronic circuit which can be efficiently implemented in hardware, such as the
4-bit S-Boxes used by Piccolo, Present and Skinny.
5It is described in the wiki of the TinyOS operating system: http://tinyos.stanford.edu/
tinyos-wiki/index.php/TinySec.
6See http://tinyos.stanford.edu/tinyos-wiki/index.php/MiniSec.
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5.1.2 Bit-slice-based
Bit-slice-based algorithms also use S-Boxes but, in this case, the S-Box is supposed to be
implemented in a bit-sliced fashion: no table look-ups are required to evaluate the S-Box
layer. Instead, some bitwise operations such as and and xor are performed on words of 𝑤
bits, thus evaluating the S-Box in parallel 𝑤 times.
S-Boxes implemented in this fashion are typically designed for this purpose. Thus,
they require only a limited number of logical operations: 4-bit ones usually need only 4
ands during their evaluation which makes their software implementation particularly easy
to mask. At the same time, they allow simple security argument based for example on
the wide trail strategy. A simple bit-sliced implementation is also related — but is not
equivalent to — a small area for a hardware implementation, meaning that such algorithms
can be expected to perform well in hardware as well.
Because of these properties, bit-sliced S-Boxes are a popular choice for the design of
lightweight algorithms, especially during the last 4 years. For example, all the algorithms
in the following list use such components.
∙ 3-Way
∙ Ascon
∙ Fantomas
∙ Fly
∙ iScream
∙ Ketje
∙ Mysterion
∙ Noekeon
∙ Pride
∙ Rectangle
∙ RoadRunneR
∙ Scream
5.1.3 Arx-based
Arx-based algorithms rely on modular addition to provide non-linearity while word-wise
rotations and xor provide diffusion, hence the name: Addition, Rotation, xor.
The bits of highest weight in the output of a modular addition are highly non-linear
functions due to the propagation of the carry. However, the lower weight bits retain
a simple dependency. Furthermore, some differentials and linear approximations have
probability 1, meaning that the structure of the linear part must be studied carefully.
In fact, to the best of our knowledge, Sparx [DPU+16] is the only arx-based primitive
designed to be provably secure against differential and linear attacks.
Modular addition is fairly expensive to implement in hardware, especially if the size of
the words is larger as this significantly increases the length of the critical path. On the
other hand, it is extremely cheap in software. Not only does it consist in one operation, it
also uses fewer or no additional registers as it can often be performed in place using the
“+=” operator.
As a consequence, arx-based ciphers are among the best performers for micro-controllers
identified using Felics. Some arx-based block and stream ciphers are listed below.
∙ Chacha20
∙ Chaskey
∙ Hight
∙ Lea
∙ RC5
∙ Salsa20
∙ Sparx
∙ Speck
∙ Xtea
5.2 Key Schedule
The key schedule is the area where lightweight algorithms differ the most from their non-
lightweight counterparts. Indeed, for algorithms intended to run on standard computers,
it is fine to have a complex key schedule as it would typically be run only once, the
corresponding subkeys being subsequently stored. For lightweight algorithms, the incurred
cost in terms of ram or gate area is unacceptable. Furthermore, it is common for
lightweight algorithms to dismiss resilience against related key attacks, a design decision
which authorizes the use of much simpler key schedules.
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Different attitudes regarding related-key attacks are discussed in Section 5.2.1. Popular
strategies for building simple key schedules are described in Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3.
Some recent proposals provide a tweak in addition to the secret key [LRW02]. It is
a public parameter which enables the use of more sophisticated modes of operation. In
fact, most of these algorithms are parts of authenticated ciphers submitted to the Caesar
competition. However, an overwhelming majority of lightweight block ciphers do not
provide this functionality.
5.2.1 On Related-Key Attacks
Some cipher designers claim resilience against related-key attacks while some other algo-
rithms are trivially vulnerable against such attacks. For example, the block cipher Prince
has a very simple related-key distinguisher because of its 𝛼-reflection. On the other hand,
other algorithms explicitly give resilience against related-key as a design criteria.
Preventing related-key attacks is a more conservative choice. Whatever the setting, from
a security standpoint, being protected against such adversaries can only be an advantage.
And yet this resilience has a cost since it implies the use of more rounds and/or more
complex key schedules which lead to a performance degradation particularly unwelcome
in the lightweight setting. Furthermore, for devices using a unique factory-defined key
throughout their lifetimes, the probability of finding two devices with the appropriate key
relation is small enough that it is of no practical concern. Similarly, if the protocols using
the ciphers are properly implemented, related-key attacks should not be possible.
The following algorithms were explicitly not designed to prevent related-key attacks.
Still, the approach used for Noekeon and Fly is a bit more subtle. Indeed, for cases where
related-key attacks might be of concern, the authors provide a modified key schedule. While
normally the master key is simply xored in the state, as for the ciphers in Section 5.2.2,
the related-key protected version imposes that the master key first goes through several
rounds of the round function so as to break any pattern relating the keys.
∙ Fantomas
∙ Fly
∙ Mysterion
∙ Noekeon
∙ Pride
∙ Prince
∙ Zorro
∙ ...
Some designers prefer to make the most conservative choice by providing related-key
security. Some of the corresponding algorithms are listed below. These usually employ
a more complex key-schedule but, since they remain lightweight ciphers, those can be
evaluated “on the fly” cheaply. It means that the subkeys are obtained by extracting bits
from a key state which is updated in every round, just like the internal state of the block
cipher. However, this update function is kept simple to limit the performance overhead.
∙ Epcbc
∙ LBlock
∙ Sea
∙ Simon
∙ Skinny
∙ Sparx
∙ Twine
∙ ...
5.2.2 Even-Mansour and “Selecting” Key Schedules
It is popular for lightweight algorithms to use a key schedule which merely selects different
bits of the master key in each round for use as subkey material along with some round
constants. If the master key of a block cipher is simply xored to the internal state during
each round along with a round constant, the key schedule can be seen as a variant of
the Even-Mansour construction [EM97]. Of course, it is possible to use said construction
directly, as is the case for the Chaskey cipher. It is also possible to use different chunks of
the master key during encryption. For example, Skipjack uses a 32-bit subset of its 80-bit
master key in each round. The subkeys therefore repeat themselves every 5 rounds. We
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call such a key schedule a selecting key schedule since it merely selects some bits of the
master key for use as subkeys.
The main advantage of such methods is that they require very little logic to compute
the round keys. Furthermore, they have no need for a key state getting updated at each
round which would be particularly expensive in hardware. This observation is what lead
the designers of the stream cipher Sprout, followed later by those of Lizard and Plantlet,
to fix the content of one of their registers to be the master key without modifying it. In
fact, the paper introducing Plantlet [MAM17] provides a detailed analysis of the way a
key stored in non-volatile memory can be accessed and its impact on both performance
and algorithm design. For example, it is better to access master key bits sequentially, like
in Skipjack and in Led, than to use master key bits that are far apart to build a given
round key.
Below, we list all ciphers using the master key in such a way that no key state needs to
be maintained. It encompasses the (iterated) Even-Mansour construction, the “selecting”
key schedules and the stream ciphers that do not modify their key register. Stream ciphers
are indicated by the “†” symbol.
∙ 3-Way
∙ Chaskey
∙ Des
∙ Fantomas
∙ Fly
∙ Gost revisited
∙ Hight
∙ iScream
∙ ITUbee
∙ Ktantan
∙ Led
∙ Lizard †
∙ Magma
∙ Midori
∙ Mysterion
∙ Noekeon
∙ Piccolo
∙ Plantlet
∙ Pride
∙ Prince
∙ RoadRunneR
∙ Robin
∙ Scream
∙ Skipjack
∙ Sprout †
∙ Xtea
∙ Zorro
The impact of such a key schedule in terms of gate area in hardware is extensively
discussed in the recent paper [MAM17] which introduced Plantlet.
5.2.3 Round Function Based
A simple strategy to have a substantial key schedule while minimising its cost is to reuse
significant parts of the round function to update the key state. The whole round function
can be used, as in Speck, or only parts of it, as in Sparx. Several block ciphers using
this principle are listed below. For Fly and Noekeon, only the key schedule protecting
against related-key attacks is concerned.
∙ Epcbc
∙ Fly
∙ Noekeon
∙ Sea
∙ Simeck
∙ Sparx
∙ Speck
5.3 No More Non-Standard Ciphers?
So far, we have discussed trends regarding algorithm design. But there is another trend at
a higher level: questionable ciphers such as those listed in Section 3.1 are being phased out.
Nowadays, the prevalence of the Aes means that using algorithms such as A5/1 would be
unacceptable. Not only new standards are concerned: previously existing standards such
as Bluetooth have been amended to move away from their previous ad hoc solutions (here,
the E0 stream cipher) and towards more common choices (for Bluetooth, the Aes). The
reason behind this change is probably two-fold.
First, the lessons from the attacks targeting proprietary algorithms have likely been
learnt. Thus, once these standards had to be replaced by more modern ones, the cryptog-
raphy used was updated at the same time.
Second, the Aes likely played a significant role. The fact that it performs decently —
even if not optimally — on a wide variety of platforms, means that it a priori constitutes
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a satisfactory choice in most situations. As explained in Section 2.5, the situation is
unfortunately a bit more complicated but using this algorithm is nevertheless a significant
step up from what was done before. As a consequence of this versatility, the Aes has been
formally standardized for use in most areas, as explained in Section 4. Still, the time it
took for the algorithms from Section 3.1 to be phased out shows the importance of getting
an algorithm choice right from the start.
6 Two Faces for Lightweight Crypto
Providing a formal definition of “lightweightness” is a difficult task because different
algorithms corresponding to different sets of requirements claim to fall under its umbrella.
In this section, we argue that the area of lightweight should be split into two distinct fields.
The first is ultra-lightweight cryptography, described in Section 6.1. The second is IoT
cryptography and is discussed in Section 6.2.
As evidenced by all the primitives listed in Section 3, a lot have been proposed: the
list in Section 3.2.1 contains only block ciphers published by academics and it contains
47 entries! More importantly, even within this a priori narrower subset, algorithms differ
greatly. Let us look at two extreme cases:
∙ Ktantan encrypts blocks consisting of at most 64 bits using an 80-bit key and 254
very simple rounds, while
∙ Lea uses 32-bit modular additions, xors and rotations to encrypt 128-bit blocks
with keys of length 128, 192 or 256.
Both of these algorithms would be considered lightweight, and rightfully so: the circuit
needed to evaluate the non-linear function of Ktantan consists only in a few gates while
Lea is one of the top performers in the Felics triathlon. And yet, a category so wide
that two algorithms so different both fit comfortably in it must be of little use in terms of
classification.
The distinction between these block ciphers goes beyond their intended target —
although Ktantan is indeed hardware-oriented and Lea software oriented. In fact,
their differences highlight another gap: what security level is desirable in the context of
lightweight cryptography? There are two broad schools of thought on this matter.
∙ Lightweight algorithms are intended to run on cheap devices securing cheap objects,
for example rfid tags used to track an inventory of T-shirts. What would be the
point in paying for a high level of security in this context? Indeed, the consequences
of an adversary successfully attacking these tags would be local at worst.
∙ On the other hand, IoT devices are, by definition, connected to the Internet. It
implies that they can be used e.g. for Denial-of-Service attacks, as has already
happened. In this context, can we afford not to have a maximum level of security?
Below, we argue that both points of view are correct. Rather, the mistake lies in
lumping both use cases together.
6.1 Ultra-Lightweight Crypto
As its name indicates, this type of algorithm deals with the most constrained use cases.
On top of the power of the devices, what defines this field is also their connectivity.
For example, rfid tags used for challenge-response based access control may not need
full-on 256-bit security against adversaries having access to the full code-book. As the
throughput of these devices is very limited, it makes sense to discard attacks requiring
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too much data. Similarly, should the secret key used by this card be recovered, the
consequences would be restricted geographically to whatever place this card was used in.
It would be the same as a physical key being lost and revoking the access of this card
would be the same as changing door locks. In this context, “weak” cryptography with only
80-bit keys may be understandable. However, a great emphasis on side-channel protection
is likely to be necessary in many cases.
Definition 1 (Ultra-Lightweight Crypto). An ultra-lightweight cryptographic algorithm
is one running on very cheap devices which are not connected to the internet, which are
easily replaced if necessary and have a limited shelf-life.
Possible use cases for such algorithms include rfid tags, Rain [Rob16] tags, smart
cards, remote car keys, memory encryption... Besides, many algorithms already fit this
bill such as Grain, Ktantan, Photon, Present, Prince, Skinny and Trivium to name
a few.
Because the implementation constraints are particularly stringent in this context, some
specific trade-offs can be relevant. For example, Prince is unlikely to make it to the top
of the Felics triathlon because its design was aimed at low-latency in hardware. Lower
block sizes are also acceptable.
Here are some properties an ideal ultra-lightweight algorithm and its implementation
may have.
∙ Type: block/stream cipher for versatility and small memory footprint.
∙ Block size: 64 bits (or more if possible).7
∙ Key size: at least 80 bits, more if possible.
∙ Relevant attacks: since the devices running ultra-lightweight algorithms have very
little computing power, they cannot be expected to produce large amounts of data.
Thus, it makes sense to only consider attacks with rather low data complexity.8 By
only considering attackers with access to, say, less than 250 plaintext/ciphertext pairs,
it is possible to reduce the total number of rounds of the primitive while retaining
𝑘 bits of security. Given the low power of the devices running ultra-lightweight
algorithms, saving several rounds may be a welcome performance gain.
∙ sca resilience: countermeasures must be easy to implement by design.
∙ Use of non-volatile memory: using non-volatile memory to store the key is cheaper,
even though it may require extra care when designing the algorithm.
∙ Functionality: only one type of operation per device — for example, the block
cipher used on a given smart card will only be used in a challenge-response protocol,
meaning that this device has no need for a hash function or a mac. The versatility
of the primitive is therefore not that important in this context.
∙ Implementation flexibility: it must be possible to optimise any of the relevant
efficiency metrics. In other words, if a low latency is needed, the algorithm should
allow it at the cost of a possible increase in area or decrease in throughput. Similarly,
a low area should be possible, etc. To quote [Rob16] (emphasis his): “flexibility gives
the opportunity to find the right trade-off”.
The ecosystem of ultra-lightweight algorithm can be expected to be diverse. While a
unique algorithm capable of fitting in every niche of the design space would be welcome, it
is likely that different algorithms are used in different cases.
7In [Rob16], Robshaw explains that even Rain rfid tags can afford blocks of 64 bits: “there is no
demand for very short block lengths (e.g. 48 bits)”.
8This limitation has already been suggested by the designers of Prince when they issued the “Prince
challenge” https://www.emsec.rub.de/research/research_startseite/prince-challenge/.
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6.2 IoT Crypto
The other subfield of lightweight cryptography is IoT cryptography. It is oriented toward
the IoT in its most literal sense, that is, it deals with objects connected to the internet.
While remaining computationally weak compared to a desktop computer or a higher end
smartphone, these devices perform multiple tasks. Accordingly, the primitive they use
must be versatile: unlike ultra-lightweight devices which only need one cryptographic
operation, IoT ones need to both encrypt and authenticate their communications with
their user, authenticate the updates from their manufacturers, etc.
Another key difference is the importance of their security. The consequences are further
reaching in the case of IoT ones due to their network connection. For example, the attacks
against the“smart” light bulbs presented in [ROSW16] can spread from one light bulb
to the next. Furthermore, it could be used effectively to jam the WiFi signal in a vast
geographical area because of the overlap between the frequencies involved. Similarly, an
insecure IoT-enabled device can be used in a DoS attack to take down websites. As we can
see, the security level needed in those cases is much higher: 80-bit keys are not acceptable
in this context, at least 128 bits are necessary.
Definition 2 (IoT Crypto). An IoT cryptographic algorithm is one running on a low-power
device connected to a global network such as the Internet.
Unlike in the ultra-lightweight case, there should ideally be only one algorithm or one
suite of algorithms for all IoT devices: as they are all networked, they must all use the
same primitives. Since some of these devices will run in conditions in which an attacker
may physically access them, such as outdoor security cameras, it is crucial that sca
counter-measures be easy to implement.
Because IoT devices perform multiple tasks, the cryptographic operations will be
performed by their multi-purpose micro-controllers rather than an electronic circuit. Thus,
software efficiency is much more important in this case. Several lightweight algorithms
have been explicitly designed for software rather than hardware implementation: Chaskey,
Fly, Lea, Pride, Sparx...
In light of all this, let us list some of the properties such an IoT algorithm should have.
∙ Type: block cipher or sponge. In the IoT case, the device must be able to perform
many different operations so a versatile primitive is needed. Furthermore, as the
intended target is a micro-controller, the idea of “burning” the key into the circuit
does not make sense. Instead, the key will have to occupy some registers which may
as well be used to build the larger internal state of a sponge.
∙ Block size: 96 bits9 is the minimum, higher sizes must be preferred. Ideally, the
internal state and the key — if any — should all fit into the registers of a typical
micro-controller.
∙ Key size: at least 128 bits. In recent years, many block cipher designers have provided
several versions of their algorithms with different key sizes, typically 80 and 128 bits.
While this might make an ultra-lightweight implementation of the smallest one more
efficient, it makes little sense in the IoT context. Indeed, in most cases, two versions
of a given algorithm have very similar performance. In the Felics ranking,10 we
can see that Simon-96/64 and Simon-128/128 follow one another and have very
similar FOM in all scenarios. The same holds for Speck-96/64 and Speck-128/128,
9A block size of 96 bits is such that the data complexity of an attack based on the birthday paradox is
216 times higher than for a 64-bit block. Attacking 64-bit block cipher is practical, as illustrated by [BL16],
but multiplying the data complexity of such attacks by 216 is sufficient to have some security margin.
10A summary of which is available at https://www.cryptolux.org/index.php/FELICS_Block_Ciphers_
Brief_Results.
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Rectangle-80 and Rectangle-128, etc. In the IoT case, a slew of key sizes as
provided e.g. by Speck is thus not necessary. Furthermore, since the algorithms
will be used by more sophisticated protocols, providing small key sizes may lead to
downgrade attacks.
∙ Relevant attacks: the security model must be more conservative than in the ultra-
lightweight case. For example, limiting the amount of data available to the adversary
would be too restrictive.
∙ sca resilience: countermeasures must be easy to implement by design.
∙ Use of non-volatile memory: the use of non-volatile memory is less relevant in this
context as the main target is software implementation.
∙ Functionalities: encryption, authentication, hashing... Such devices communicate
non-trivial data with different actors, which means that they require several crypto-
graphic functionalities.
∙ Flexibility: the algorithm must be decently efficient on a wide range of micro-
controllers. Hardware efficiency is less important but it may help with hardware
acceleration.
7 Conclusion
Lightweight cryptography has received significant attention in the last two decades and
even more so in the last 5 years. The need for such algorithms is well established, as
evidenced by the nist effort to standardize such algorithms and the short-comings of the
Aes in this context.
Table 11: A summary of the differences between ultra-lightweight and IoT cryptography.
Ultra-Lightweight IoT
Block size 64 bits ≥ 128 bits
Security level ≥ 80 bits ≥ 128 bits
Relevant attacks low data/time complexity Same as “regular” crypto
Intended platform dedicated circuit (asic, rfid...) micro-controllers, low-end cpus
sca resilience important important
Functionality one per device, e.g. authentication encryption, authentication, hashing...
Connection temporary, only to a given hub permanent, to a global network
However, the spectrum of use cases encompassed by “lightweightness” has become
too wide. Thus, we propose to split the field of lightweight cryptography into two areas
corresponding to two different types of requirements: ultra-lightweight and IoT cryptog-
raphy, whose particularities are summarized in Table 11. There are of course common
criteria between those cases such as the emphasis that needs to be put on resilience against
side channel attacks. Still, we think that the difference between the two is relevant. In
particular, we think this separation is necessary because of the different levels of security
they demand: connecting a family of devices to a global network and protecting them
with an 80-bit key is not a desirable situation, and yet it is what may happen if an
ultra-lightweight algorithm is used where an IoT one is needed.
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A List of Ligthweight Ciphers from the Industry
A.1 Industry-Designed Stream Ciphers
A5/1. The exact design date of this algorithm is unclear but a first approximation of
its inner workings was published in 1994 [And94]. It generates a keystream from a 22-bit
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IV along with a 64-bit key using three different lfsrs whose lengths add up to 64 bits.
Practical attacks have been implemented using time-memory trade-offs exploiting the fact
that the update function of the internal state is not bijective [Gol97, BSW01]. The most
time efficient of those needs only 224 simple steps provided that a significant (but practical)
pre-computation was performed. Furthermore, 10 bits of the key were always set to 0 in
many implementations. The 2G gsm protocol still uses this algorithm.
A5/2. A cipher somewhat similar similar to A5/1 but even weaker was intended to
be used in countries targeted by American export restrictions. It is called A5/2. It is
vulnerable to ciphertexts only attacks with complexity 216 using redundancy introduced
by error correcting codes. It requires a one-time pre-computation of practical complexity.
Unfortunately, interoperability imposed the implementation of this algorithm on devices
supposed to run A5/1 instead, thus making downgrade attacks possible [BBK03, BBK08].
A5-GMR-1 and A5-GMR-2. Satellite phones have their own protocols and, therefore, use
their own cryptographic algorithms. The two algorithms used, A5-GMR-1 and A5-GMR-2,
were reverse-engineered by Driessen et al. in [DHW+12]. Those are very different from
one another but both are easily attacked.
∙ A5-GMR-1 is a variant of A5/2 with an internal state consisting in 4 lfsrs with
a total size of 82 bits. Those are clocked irregularly, much like in A5/2. It can
be attacked using only known ciphertexts by inverting 221 triangular matrices of
size 532 × 532, which requires roughly 221 × 5322/2 ≈ 238.1 simple operations. A
significant but practical pre-computation step is necessary.
∙ A5-GMR-2 is a byte oriented stream cipher with a much more sophisticated structure
based on 3 different components denoted ℱ ,𝒢 and ℋ by Driessen et al.. Surprisingly,
ℋ uses the S-Box 𝑆2 and 𝑆6 of the Des. A practical attack with very low data and
time complexity is presented in [LLLS14]. It requires guessing at most 32 bits using
only 1 frame of 15 bytes for an average complexity of 228.
Atmel Ciphers. The stream ciphers used by the SecureMemory, CryptoMemory and
CryptoRF families of products from Atmel are similar to one another. They are proprietary
algorithms which were reverse-engineered and attacked by Garcia et al. in [GvRVWS10].
Other more powerful attacks were later proposed by Biryukov et al. [BKZ11] breaking the
cipher of SecureMemory in time 229.8 using 1 frame and the cipher of CryptoMemory in
time 250 using 30 frames and about 530 Mb of memory. The ciphers rely on 3 nlfsrs
with a total size of a bit more than 100 bits. The attacks found by both Garcia et al. and
Biryukov et al. were successfully implemented.
Crypto-1. It is a stream cipher used by the Mifare classic line of smartcards of nxp.
It was reverse-engineered by Nohl et al. in [NESP08] and was subsequently attacked by
many teams [CNO08, Gol13] with a time complexity as low as 232. It has been used at
least since 1998 but the exact date of its design is unclear. It is based on a 48-bit lfsr
combined with several non-linear Boolean functions.
Content Scrambling System (Css). In order to implement Digital Rights Managements
(drms), the content of dvd discs is encrypted. This encryption used to be performed with
a stream cipher called Css. It uses two 17- and 25-bit long lfsrs to generate two 8-bit
words in parallel. These are afterwards added modulo 28 to obtain a byte of keystream.
However, unlike in most stream ciphers, this key stream is not simply xored with the
plaintext. Instead, the plaintext first goes through an 8-bit bijective S-Box whose result is
added to the keystream to obtain the ciphertext. This operation is sometimes called the
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mangling step. A full description is available in [BD04] and in [PMA07]. Several powerful
attacks target the protocol using this stream cipher. However, given its key length of 40
bits, the cipher alone is vulnerable to a brute-force search of time complexity 240.
Common Scrambling Algorithm (Csa-SC). The Common Scrambling Algorithm is used
to secure digital television broadcast. It cascades two ciphers, as described in [WW05].
The first is a block cipher which we call Csa-BC and which is described below. The
second is a stream cipher which we call Csa-SC. The stream cipher is based on two fsrs
consisting of twenty 4-bit cells each and a combiner with memory. The feedback function
of the registers involves, among other things, several 5× 2 S-Boxes. The combiner uses
addition modulo 24 to extract 2 bits of keystream from its internal state and the two shift
registers at each clock cycle. In [WW05], several undesirable properties are presented. For
example, the keystream often has very short cycles. It is also possible to recover the secret
key by solving about 228 systems of 60 linear equations with 40 unknowns which must
take at most 228× 603 ≈ 245.7.
Dsc. The Dect11 Standard Cipher, usually abbreviated into Dsc, is a stream cipher used
to encrypt the communications of cordless phones. First, attacks targeting the protocol
using it and its flawed implementation were presented in [LST+09]. It was subsequently
reverse-engineered and its attackers found practical attacks requiring only about 215
samples of keystream and 234 trial encryptions which take a couple of hours on a standard
computer to recover the key [NTW10]. It is described by the authors of this paper as
being “an asynchronous stream cipher with low gate complexity that takes a 64-bit secret
key and a 35-bit initialization vector.” Its structure, based on irregularly clocked lfsrs, is
reminiscent of that of A5/1.
E0. The privacy of the Bluetooth protocol is now based on the Aes but it used to rely
on a custom stream cipher called E0. Its 128-bit internal state is divided into 4 lfsrs
and its filter function has its own 2-bit memory. A description of E0 can be found in the
papers presenting attacks against it such as [FL01, LV04, LMV05]. Lu et al. found an
attack which recovers the secret key using the first 24 bits of 223.8 frames and with 238
computations.
Hitag2 ; Megamos. These stream ciphers are used in the car immobilizers implemented
by different car manufacturers. These devices prevent a car engine from starting unless a
specific transponder is close to them. While initially kept secret, the first was published by
Wiener12 and the second was reverse-engineered by Verdult et al. [VGE13]. They are both
stream ciphers with a small internal state of 48 and 57 bits respectively. These small sizes
and other weaknesses in the ciphers themselves and in the protocols using them lead to
practical attacks against the devices relying on these algorithms for security. For example,
it is possible to attack a car key using Hitag2 using 1 min of communication between the
key and the car and about 235 encryptions. The secret key of Megamos can be recovered
in time 248 but more powerful attacks are possible when we take into account the key
management method of the devices using it.
iClass. Formally, iClass is family of smartcards introduced in 2002. The stream cipher it
uses was reverse-engineered and attacked by Garcia et al. in [GdKGV14]. It has a 40-bit
internal state. The cryptanalysts who reverse-engineered it presented attacks against
11Dect stands for “Digital Enhanced Cordless Telecommunications”.
12While this first publication is mentioned for example by Verdult et al. in [VGB12], we were not able
to find a copy of it. Nevertheless, the specification of Hitag2 can be found in [VGB12].
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this cipher in the same paper. By recording 222 authentication attempts, the key can be
recovered using 240 trial encryptions.
Kindle Cipher (PC1). This stream cipher was first published on Usenet by Alexander
Pukall in 1997, meaning that this algorithm was not technically designed in the industry.
However, it was not designed by academics and Amazon used it at least up until 2012
for the drm scheme “protecting” its e-book using the mobi file format. It uses a 128-bit
key and a separate 24-bit internal state updated using different operations, including
modular multiplications. The keystream is generated byte by byte. It has been broken by
Biryukov et al. [BLR13] using e.g. 220 known plaintexts and a time of 231. Even practical
known-ciphertexts attacks are possible in some contexts.
Oryx. While A5/1 “secures” gsm communications in Europe, the stream cipher Oryx was
chosen by the Telecom Industry Association Standard (tia) to secure phone communications
in north America. A description of the algorithm can be found in [WSD+99] where practical
attacks are presented. It uses a 96-bit key, a 96-bit internal state consisting of three 32-bit
lfsrs, and an 8-bit S-Box which changes every time. It is possible to attack it in time 216
using 25 bytes of known plaintext.
RC4. First designed by Ron Rivest in 1987, this stream cipher was intended to remain
a trade secret of the Rsa company. However, it was leaked to the cypherpunk mailing
list in 1994 [Nob94] and turned out to be a remarkably simple algorithm. Unfortunately
it has several issues, in particular when its first outputs are not discarded. The attack
from [ABP+13] was successfully implemented: using between 228 and 232 encryptions of
the same message, it is possible to recover it using biases in the keystream.
The now deprecated wep protocol for wireless communications used it for encryption.
It lead to practical attacks implemented e.g. by the aircrack13 tool allowing an attacker
to recover the password protecting WiFi access. It uses a 256-byte internal state containing
all numbers in {0, ..., 255} which is updated using a very simple rule each time an 8-bit
output is generated. It supports all key sizes between 40 and 2048 bits, although it usually
uses 128-bit keys.
A.2 Industry-Designed Block Ciphers
Cmea This block cipher was used by the tia to secure the transmission of phone numbers
across telephone lines. A good description of this algorithm is provided in [WSK97] which,
incidentally, describes an attack against the full cipher. It encrypts a block of an arbitrary
number of bytes — although in practice those were usually 2 to 6 bytes long — using a
64-bit key. It is vulnerable to a known plaintext attacks requiring only 40–80 blocks of
data and taking a time between 224 and 232 encryptions. Its 8-bit S-Box seems to contain
a hidden structure [Per17].
Cryptomeria. It is a block cipher nicknamed “C2” in the literature. It shares the same
structure as the Des: it encrypts 64-bit blocks using a 56-bit key and uses a 32-bit Feistel
function. It works by mixing in a 32-bit subkey with a modular addition, then use one
8-bit S-Box call followed by a 32-bit linear permutation. The S-Box is secret, so an S-Box
recovery attack has been proposed [BKLM09]. The same paper presents a key recovery
with time complexity 248. This algorithm was intended from the start to be used by
“things”, namely dvd players (in which case it can be seen as a successor of Css) and some
SD cards. In total, 10 rounds are used; which means that only 10 S-Box calls are needed
13Its successor, aircrack-ng, is described on its official website http://www.aircrack-ng.org/.
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to encrypt one 64-bit block compared to, say, the 160 calls needed to encrypt one 128-bit
block using Aes-128.
Common Scrambling Algorithm (Csa-BC). The Common Scrambling Algorithm uses a
stream cipher (described above) and a block cipher which we call Csa-BC. It encrypts a
64-bit block using a 64-bit key. Its structure is reminiscent of a generalised Feistel network
using eight 8-bit branches. The Feistel functions are based on a unique random-looking
8-bit S-Box 𝐵 and a variant defined as 𝜎 ∘ 𝐵, where 𝜎 is a simple bit permutation. An
encryption consists in 56 rounds. A full specification is given in [WW05]. To the best of
our knowledge, there is no attack other than brute-force against this cipher.
Dst40. This algorithm was reverse-engineered from partial information disclosed in a
patent and from a physical device implementing this block cipher [BGS+05]. It was used
by rfid transponders sold by Texas Instrument. They were used in car immobilizers and
for electronic payment. The cipher itself encrypts a 40-bit block with a 40-bit key using
200 rounds of an unbalanced Feistel network. The Feistel function maps 38 bits of internal
state and a 40-bit subkey to a 2-bit output by nesting several Boolean functions. Due to
its key size of 40 bits, a brute-force search is practical.
Keeloq. It is a so-called “code-hopping encoder”. A US patent was filed in 1993 and
eventually granted in 1996 [BSK96] but it was designed earlier, around 1985 [Lea14]. Using
modern terminology, it is a 32-bit block cipher which uses a 64-bit key. It was first kept
secret but its specification was leaked in 2006. Using this information, several teams
presented practical attacks against devices using this algorithm [IKD+08]. For example,
the key be recovered using 216 known plaintexts and 244.5 encryptions. Far more powerful
side-channel attacks have also been proposed against commercial implementations of the
cipher [EKM+08]. This ciphers was still in use when these attacks were found, 20 years
after its design.
A.3 Industry-Designed Macs
SecurID mac. A SecurID is small hardware token used for authentication and designed
by sdti (which was later bought by Rsa Security). It displays a 6 digit number which
changes every minute. It is based on a 64-bit mac described for example in [BLP04]. This
paper also presents attacks against the algorithm. The details of the mac were initially
kept secret but were eventually leaked which lead to the attacks of Biryukov et al.. These
were later sped up by Contini et al. [CY04] to obtain a time complexity of about 244 mac
computations.
